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ABSTRACT
This article examines the dynamic nature with which independent account-
ability mechanisms operate. Focusing on the World Bank, the authors argue
that its Inspection Panel evolves according to internal and external pressures.
In seeking to achieve equilibrium, and protect its authority and independence,
the Panel has gone through several distinct phases: negotiation, emergence,
protracted resistance, assertion of independence and authority, renewed ten-
sion, and contestation. The core novelty of the article is its application of
concepts from outside the field of development studies — notably institu-
tional accountability from the governance literature, and judicialization from
the legal studies literature — to the topic of the Inspection Panel. Examining
the Panel in this way demonstrates that accountability mechanisms represent
a hybrid of transnational governance influenced by a range of actors including
project-affected peoples, national governments, managers and development
donors. Accountability in development finance is about competing interests
as well as competing conceptions and expectations of accountability. In such
a complex and multi-scalar system, the Panel is not only concerned with
delivering well-researched investigation reports; it is also an entity seeking
to ensure its own survival, as well as an arbiter of its own brand of legitimacy
and accountability.
INTRODUCTION
Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) make it possible for citi-
zens and communities to challenge decisions made by multilateral develop-
ment banks (MDBs) in the context of their operations and projects. IAMs
contribute to holding MDBs accountable for their decisions through in-
dependently administered processes intended to provide affected people
with access to recourse and possible redress (Hunter, 2003; Hunter and
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Udall, 1993; World Bank, 2009). Indeed, as Bradlow (1993) and Hey (1997)
argue, the creation of IAMs — with the Inspection Panel (IP) at the World
Bank being the first such mechanism — represents a watershed moment
in international legal jurisprudence since it establishes a new forum where
‘private actors’ who are in a non-contractual relationship with an interna-
tional organization ‘can hold [the organization] directly accountable for the
consequences of its failure’. Moreover, Zalcberg (2012: 2) suggests, in the
creation of IAMs, the integration of principles such as justice or sustainabil-
ity in development practice is ‘an imperative rather than an aspiration’.
Theoretically, IAMs have the potential to improve internal governance in
terms of ‘vertical accountability’ between staff and management or manage-
ment and Executive Boards, and ‘horizontal accountability’ between MDBs
and external stakeholders, as well as increasing external legitimacy (Naude´
Fourie, 2016; Shihata, 2000; Woods and Narlikar, 2001). By executing their
mandates — extending to functions such as problem solving, fact find-
ing, compliance review, policy advice and monitoring (Bradlow and Naude´
Fourie, 2011) — IAMs can spotlight missing or inaccurate information, un-
cover flaws in project risk assessments and designs, highlight institutional
non-compliance with operational policies, and enlighten MDBmanagement
on structural issues and project-related problems. The World Bank’s IP in
particular does this by expanding existing check-and-balance mechanisms
so that external concerns can reach the Executive Board of the Bank di-
rectly without interference, and by creating a public record of how well the
institution is complying with its own safeguards (Shihata, 2000; Sovacool,
2013).
If IAMs such as the World Bank’s IP have such potential, how do they
actually perform in practice? Is the narrative of a benign, progressive IP
battling against a malignant, oppressive World Bank Group (WBG) overly
simplistic and at times misleading? Questions about the effectiveness of
the IP, and IAMs in general, have long been part of a larger debate about
the accountability and legitimacy of MDBs and other intergovernmental ac-
tors (Ananthanarayanan, 2004; Carrasco and Guernsey, 2008; Circi, 2006;
Nurmukhametova, 2006; Orakhelashvili, 2005). However, opinions about
effectiveness remain mixed and definitive answers seem elusive. Such elu-
siveness arises largely because, for stakeholders, ‘effectiveness’ is generally
understood to entail the alignment of specific aims with concrete outcomes,
whereas in reality they hold conflicting expectations as to which account-
ability outcomes IAMs should realize.
In this article, we assess whether theWorld Bank’s IP is effective at realiz-
ing the accountability-related objectives for which it was originally created.
The core novelty of the manuscript is its application of concepts from out-
side of development studies — notably that of institutional accountability
from the governance literature, and that of judicialization from the legal
studies literature — to the topic of the IP. We explore the dynamic nature
of the institutional context in which the IP operates, as well as its body of
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practice over time. In contrast to a simple storyline of a ‘good’ IP struggling
against a ‘bad’ WBG, this article argues that, in the quarter-century since
its inception, the Panel has evolved and continues expanding in response to
often competing demands and expectations of ‘internal’ stakeholder groups
and ‘external’ stakeholder groups (typically, project-affected people and lo-
cal as well as international civil society organizations representing specific
interests). In seeking to achieve a dynamic equilibrium among these con-
flicting demands and expectations, while simultaneously fighting to protect
its de facto institutional independence and authority vis-a`-vis World Bank
management and staff, we argue that the IP has gone through six distinct
‘phases’ in its institutional history: ‘negotiation’, ‘emergence’, ‘protracted
resistance’, ‘assertion of authority’, ‘renewed tension’ and ‘contestation’.
In proceeding on this path, we intend to make two contributions, one the-
oretical, and one empirical. Theoretically, analysing the IP — what it does,
how it executes its mandate and whether it is ‘effective’ — offers a unique
chance to explore a new, hybrid form of governance involving IAMs that op-
erate transnationally according to ‘quasi-judicial’ principles (Bradlow and
Naude´ Fourie, 2013; Kingsbury et al., 2005; Naude´ Fourie, 2009, 2012).
Tignino (2016) notes that quasi-judicial bodies such as the IP are intended
to both help resolve ambiguity and uncertainty by reducing transaction costs
and also improve compliance and thus legitimacy. Such bodies can also
promote ‘pluralized normativity’ in seeking to influence a broader range
of stakeholders (d’Aspremont, 2011). The World Bank IP particularly re-
flects principles of decentralized, ‘citizen-driven’ accountability attempting
to create more responsive systems of redress for people harmed by projects
(Bradlow and Naude´ Fourie, 2013; Lewis, 2012). In sum: examining the
World Bank’s IP offers a rare chance to test the efficacy of an evolving form
of transnational governance, while also gathering insight about the dynam-
ics at play within the pluralist and complex development context in which
bodies like the IP operate.
Additionally, the article makes an empirical contribution by focusing on
the World Bank and the growing body of practice of the IP. From 1994
to 2016, the Inspection Panel received 116 ‘cases’ (or ‘Requests for In-
spection’) as Figure 1 illustrates. This number may not appear very high
when compared to the case load of most judicial bodies, but considering
that a Request can only be filed by groups of affected people (indeed, it
is not uncommon for a Request to be accompanied by thousands of signa-
tures of individuals supporting it) and that those 116 cases have originated
from 50 countries, the significance of this body of practice becomes clear.
Therefore, developing deeper insights about the operational processes and
internal workings of the World Bank is of global importance for scholars
of public policy and practitioners of development. Placing those insights in
their broader ‘transnational development context’, moreover, is particularly
timely: the complex and more complete narrative is becoming ever more
salient as MDBs like the World Bank face increased pressure and com-
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Figure 1. Overview of Number of World Bank Inspection Panel Cases
Received, 1994–2016
Source: compiled by the authors.
petition from new entrants in the development finance market (Bradlow,
2011).
RESEARCHMETHODS, CASE SELECTION AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
The body of practice of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel (that is, cases
filed at the IP from 1994 up to the end of 2016) serves as the primary source
of data for our case study. This in itself is a contribution, as it differs from
case studies using secondary data (such as Sovacool, 2017a, 2017b; Wade,
2009) or assessments that focus on dominant individuals at the World Bank
such as former President James Wolfensohn (Mallaby, 2004). Contrasted
with publications from the IP itself (World Bank Inspection Panel, 2011,
2014, 2015, 2016), our analysis is also independent and without conflict of
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interest. Our primary sources of data are therefore the archives and cases
of the IP itself, supplemented with a critical review of the peer-reviewed
literature.
The IP is part of a complex legal and institutional environment at theWorld
Bank, which includes The Articles of Agreement of the IBRD and IDA
— the constitutive treaties and associated rules and procedures underlying
World Bank institutions — as well as various Operational Policies and
Procedures, or OPPs, which are aimed at regulating the Bank’s development-
lending operations.According toNaude´ Fourie (2015: 99), among the critical
components of these OPPs are the WBG’s ‘safeguard policies’, which are
designed particularly to manage environmental, social and economic risks.
The legal nature of the OPPs is disputed: internal stakeholders generally
emphasize their non-legal and internal nature (Schlemmer-Schulte, 1999;
Shihata, 2000),whereas external and public stakeholders often envision them
as a form of potent institutional law (Alvarez, 2005; Boisson de Chazournes,
2005). Bradlow and Naude´ Fourie (2013) remark that the OPPs add an
additional layer of hybridity on top of the IP’s dynamics, since they exist
at the nexus between judicial and court institutions executing mandates of
review, and citizen-driven institutions executing mandates of fact-finding
and compliance.
The focus on World Bank-financed development projects, which in turn
are subjects of IP investigations, is justified by the continued significance
of the World Bank — not only because of the size of its development-
lending portfolio, but also because of its influence on policy development.
As Bignami (2016: 326) observes, theWBG is ‘a leader among international
development organizations . . . among global administrative bodies, the
WB is widely credited with having made some of the most far-reaching
reforms in favor of civil society’. Even critics point out that the WBG
‘is profoundly important infrastructure for the promotion of a rights-based
approach to development’ (Bugalski, 2016a: 3).Moreover, theWorldBank’s
trajectory of civil society reform is fairly representative of other MDBs, and
it arguably has the most comprehensive IAM (Bradlow and Naude´ Fourie,
2011; Gartner, 2013; Kingsbury, 1999).
The key theoretical framework guiding interpretation of our data is that
of ‘institutional accountability’. Although it is not the purpose of this study
to exhaustively explore the topic of accountability, a few themes from the
literature deserve a mention — starting with definitional aspects. Generally,
accountability can be defined as the process by which ‘actors record and
disclose their behavior, in the broadest sense of the word, to an external
audience (forum or principal)’ (Schillemans and Busuioc, 2015: 193). Kim
and Lim (2014) argue that accountability can also be conceptualized as
consisting of three interlinked elements: responsibility, answerability and
enforceability. The authors define ‘responsibility’ as referring to ‘respec-
tive responsibilities of each actor or set of actors’, ‘answerability’ denot-
ing ‘to whom to turn . . . for a reasoned justification for actions’, with
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‘enforceability’ referring to ‘who ensures appropriate corrective or remedial
actions are taken’ (ibid.: 4). IAMs such as the IP have potential to enhance all
three elements within the context of MDB development-lending operations,
although the ‘enforceability’ aspect remains, perhaps by intent, the weakest
part.
Systems dynamics and constitutional legal theory provide some insight
into factors driving institutional accountability. Naude´ Fourie (2009, 2012)
conceptualizes these matters in terms of the assertion of quasi-judicial au-
thority or power and independence. This model of ‘quasi-judicial oversight
or review’ incorporates both the nature of quasi-judicial power (what it
entails, how it is performed) and its outcomes (the results to which it con-
tributes). It reflects dynamics existing between the quasi-judicial body and
broader political organs (in this case, the IP, the Executive Board and World
Bank management, respectively). This model of quasi-judicial review is
based on a hypothesis that there is a significant degree of functional equiv-
alence between courts exercising a mandate of judicial review and IAMs
executing a mandate of compliance review (ibid.). Much of this equivalence
lies in how such review bodies execute their mandates, but it also echoes
dynamics that exist between judicial or quasi-judicial review bodies and
the legislative, executive and administrative political institutions within the
system (Koopmans, 2003).
The model describes these dynamics in terms of two related variables:
independence and authority. Firstly, judicial bodies strive to protect their de
facto independence, in particular from internal influence— namely from po-
litical institutions whose decisions ultimately form subjects of their review.
Secondly, judicial bodies tend to assert and expand their authority vis-a`-vis
those political institutions — a phenomenon that is sometimes described as
‘judicialization’ (Ely, 1980; Hirschl, 2004). These variables typically func-
tion in a positive or reinforcing feedback loop: if one variable changes, the
other also changes in the same direction (Sterman, 2000). Specifically, if
a judicial body expands its degree of judicialization, the extent of its inde-
pendence is strengthened. The opposite is also true: if influence weakens,
independence is adversely affected as well.
Judicial bodies have an incentive to expand their de facto independence
and influence (‘power’); however, they are unlikely to do so indefinitely,
because of ‘limits’ to the ‘success’ of an expansion strategy due to backlash
from various limiting factors (Anderson and Johnson, 1997). These nar-
row factors can include restrictions caused by institutional budgets; heavy
caseloads; lack of cooperation from political institutions (for example, a re-
fusal to enforce judgments or act on findings); and even actions specifically
aimed at cutting a judicial body ‘down to size’ (by reducing its mandate, or
by ‘packing the bench’) (Naude´ Fourie, 2009). As a result of such limiting
factors, the degrees of independence and judicialization of judicial bodies
typically retract to lower levels, causing the polarity of change to switch
from positive to negative.
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Figure 2. A Model of Judicial Authority and Independence
Source: compiled by the authors.
On the other hand, decreases in independence and judicialization are likely
to trigger backlash from alternative limiting factors. Notably, the credibility
of the judicial body will suffer, which could make institutional cooperation
less likely and could also have a negative impact on whether external parties
view it as an effective avenue for obtaining recourse and redress. In order to
survive in such circumstances, the judicial body would have to take actions
that would, once again, reverse the polarity of the feedback loop, therefore
increasing its degrees of independence and judicialization.
In a graphical representation of such behaviour over time (Anderson and
Johnson, 1997; Sterman, 2000), quasi-judicial review can be observed to
fluctuate between higher and lower degrees of independence and judicial-
ization — what might be described as fluctuations between positions of
‘restraint’ and ‘activism’ (Lindquist and Cross, 2009; Roosevelt, 2006). To
guarantee long-term survival and efficacy, a (quasi-)judicial body is likely
to seek equilibrium within the system. If plotted as presented in Figure 2,
this can be illustrated as a judicial body’s evolution along a line of general
progression.
This model emphasizes dynamism of power and authority. In the words
of Albie Sachs (former justice of the South African constitutional court):
It would seem, then, that no general theory requiring either judicial maximalism or judicial
minimalism can usefully be advanced. There is a time to be cautious and a time to be bold, a
time for discretion to be the better part of valour and a time for valour to be the better part of
discretion. And it would appear that there is no logic intrinsic to the judicial function itself
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that can tell us when the clock strikes for valour and when for caution. The question then
becomes not one of whether but one of when. (Sachs, 2001: 90)
Generally, judicial bodies do not operate in a vacuum: their actions (and
inactions) have sometimes unintended consequences. This might require
strategic behaviours that further alter the complex system. These dynamics
are at play throughout the history of the IP.
THE INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THEWORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL
Although the precise drivers behind the creation of the IP are dynamic and
difficult to isolate historically, the need for such a mechanism has existed
since the inception of the World Bank. When formed at the Bretton Woods
Conference of 1944, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD)—which quickly became known as the World Bank—was
intended to serve as an organization that would promote post-World War
II reconstruction of European economies. However, the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods exchange rate system created serious economic issues for
many developing countries, especially those in debt, and theWorld Bank be-
gan to morph into its new mission of a funding institution (the International
Finance Corporation) and a development and aid agency (the International
Development Association). The mission of the World Bank Group now
involved a portfolio spread across diverse tasks: post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, biodiversity, crime, and public participation in development planning,
to name a few. This expanded mission generated significant tensions as
WBG-financed projects encountered resistance from local communities or
generated deleterious social and economic impacts (Sovacool, 2017a).
In this section, the story of the IP is presented in terms of the six evolution-
ary phases mentioned above: negotiation, emergence, protracted resistance,
assertion of independence and authority, renewed tension, and contestation.
Much of the Panel’s history has been dealt with extensively elsewhere, es-
pecially the periods covered by the first four phases (Clark, 1999, 2003a;
van Putten, 2008; Shihata, 2000); other works have focused on individual
members of the IP, notably its chairs.1 Although these individuals have ex-
erted their influence over the shape and structure of the IP, we pay greater
attention to the broader institutional dynamics and to recent developments
reflected in the last two phases. We further illustrate how the IP both arose
out of, and propagated, contestation.
1. The IP Chairs have been: Gonzalo Castro de la Mata (current), Eimi Watanabe (2013–
14), Alf Jerve (2012–13), Roberto Lenton (2009–12), Werner Kiene (2007–09), Edith
Brown Weiss (2003–07), Edward S. Ayensu (2002–03), Jim MacNeill (1999–2001), Al-
varo Uman˜a-Quesada (1997–98), Richard E. Bissell (1996–97) and Ernst Gunther Bro¨der
(1994–95).
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Negotiation (1980s to 1993)
The idea of an IP began to germinate in the 1980s when non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) criticized the WBG for violating its own policies
regarding involuntary resettlement (policy dating from 1982), tribal peo-
ples (also from 1982), and environmental impact assessment (from 1988)
(Bignami, 2016). The Sardar Sarovar Dam and Canal projects on the Nar-
mada River in India (known as the ‘Narmada projects’) were a flashpoint
for these concerns, as they involved the forced relocation and resettlement
of more than 120,000 people and resulted in significant environmental harm
(Wade, 2011). The largest project, the Sardar Sarovar Dam, submerged
37,000 hectares of land and required the evacuation and resettlement of 245
villages of mostly indigenous peoples across the states of Gujarat, Maha-
rashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The canal network necessitated the clearing
of 80,000 ha of land for construction (Clark, 2003b). The WBG approved
funding for these projects throughout the 1980s and continued to make
disbursements even after civil society groups raised serious social and en-
vironmental concerns. By the early 1990s, the WBG was ‘under attack’
(World Bank, 2003: 2) and had become ‘a lightning rod for transnational
protest’ (Fox, 2003: xi). Early NGO proposals called for the creation of an
independent mechanism that would respond to and investigate complaints
from project-affected peoples (Hunter and Udall, 1993; Wold and Zaelke,
1992).
As a response to the growing outcry, in 1991 the WBG President at
the time, Barber Conable, created an independent commission to review the
Narmada projects; the commissionwas to be headed byBranfordMorse, a re-
tired senior administrator from the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), and Thomas Berger, a former Supreme Court Justice from British
Columbia, Canada. In 1992, the commission released a report, informally
known as the ‘Morse Commission Report’, and identified ‘serious compli-
ance failures’ by theWBG as well as ‘devastating human and environmental
consequences of those violations’ (World Bank, 2009: 3). Follow-up inves-
tigations across the WBG’s entire portfolio found that managers habitually
failed to follow organizational goals of poverty alleviation and environmen-
tal protection (Werlin, 2003). TheWapenhans Report, theWBG’s own 1992
internal review of its lending practices (World Bank, 1992), concluded that
the WBG was ‘suffering from a performance crisis’ with almost 40 per cent
of projects scoring ‘unsatisfactory’ ratings, widespread defaults on loans
and an overall ‘culture of approval’ that prioritized making loans at the ex-
pense of local communities and preserving ecosystems (Clark, 2003a). Part
of the explanation was that managers were rewarded for moving forward as
many projects as possible but were not penalized if those projects suffered
from poor design or shortcomings in accommodating local peoples. The
implication was that the WBG’s violations of its procedures symbolized a
systematic failure on the part of Bank management (World Bank, 2009).
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The idea for an Inspection Panel was not universally supported within
the WBG, particularly amongst Bank management and Executive Board
members from borrower countries, who identified the potential for placing
blame for project failures on management and staff or borrowers. This issue,
and the pressure it placed on the IP to placate both management and the
Board (while also safeguarding at least a minimum degree of independence)
would resurface time and again, as will be illustrated below.
Emergence (1993 to 1994)
The World Bank Executive Board established the IP in September 1993
as an ‘Independent Accountability Mechanism’ to commence operations on
1 August 1994. In the years that followed, different accounts emerged de-
scribing circumstances surrounding the IP’s establishment. Of particular
interest in these accounts is the different emphasis they place on the con-
clusive role played by external versus internal stakeholder groups. Shihata
(2000: 1–2) recognizes that internal ‘concerns’ ‘coincided with, and were in-
fluenced by sources inside and outside the Bank’, but nevertheless concludes
that ‘the initial concern was a managerial one’. Other accounts emphasize
‘public pressure exerted by external stakeholders, notably, civil society orga-
nizations based in the United States and Europe’ as the decisive factor in the
Panel’s establishment (Bradlow, 1999; Naude´ Fourie, 2016: 84; van Putten,
2008). Hansungule criticizes Shihata’s account as an effort ‘to underplay
the role of external pressures towards [the Panel’s] establishment’, which
‘is only grudgingly acknowledged and only in a few lines while attention is
lavishly given to the Bank official’s roles’ (Hansungule, 2001: 148–49).
What these competing narratives reveal is that the IP would come to fulfil
two often-competing roles: ‘to enhance the efficiency of the Bank’s opera-
tions and to meet the demand for greater transparency and accountability’
(Baimu and Panou, 2011). This dual purpose is reflected in formal descrip-
tions of the Panel’s mandate. For example, the Bank has explained that the
mandate of the IP was to provide a forum ‘for people who believe that
they may be adversely affected by Bank-financed operations to bring their
concerns to the highest decision-making levels of the World Bank’ (World
Bank, 2009). The IP notes that it operates ‘as an independent forum to pro-
vide accountability and recourse for communities affected by Bank-financed
projects, to address harms resulting from policy noncompliance, and to help
improve development effectiveness of the Bank’s operations’ (World Bank
Inspection Panel, 2011: 11). In the words of former WBG president, James
Wolfensohn:
When the Board of Directors of the World Bank created the [IP, it was] an unprecedented
means for increasing the transparency and accountability of the Bank’s operations. This
was a first of its kind for an international organization — the creation of an independent
mechanism to respond to claims by those whom we are most intent on helping that they
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have been adversely affected by the projects we finance. By giving private citizens — and
especially the poor — a new means of access to the Bank, it has empowered and given voice
to those we most need to hear . . . . The Inspection Panel tells us whether we are following
our own policies and procedures, which are intended to protect the interests of those affected
by our projects as well as the environment. (Quoted in Sovacool, 2013: 75)
Although the idea was hotly debated, eventually the Board decided to estab-
lish the IP in order to ‘do the thing which board members just couldn’t do,
which is travel out to the field, talk to NGOs, receive complaints, and ensure
that management would do what it had promised to do’ (van Putten, 2008:
346).
To assuage its member countries and borrowing governments, the WBG
structured its IP to consist of three separate ‘circles’. The first was composed
of three individual members of the IP, each from a different member coun-
try, appointed for a non-renewable five-year term. After completion of their
terms, IP members could not be employed again within the World Bank
Group. Members were selected on the basis of their ‘ability to deal thor-
oughly and fairly with the Requests brought to them, their integrity and their
independence from Bank Management’ (World Bank, 2009). The second
circle consisted of an Executive Secretariat and a small number of support
staff created to advise and assist the members in executing their duties. The
third circle consisted of internationally recognized experts to assist the IP
with specific investigations, providing members with reliable information in
fields as diverse as anthropology, forestry and hydrology.
The first IP investigation in 1994 concerned the proposed Arun III Hydro-
electric Project in Nepal. The Nepal Arun III investigation demonstrated the
potential power of the IP, and amplified the hopes, particularly of external
stakeholders, that it would succeed (Bradlow, 1996). The IP’s investigation
of the US$ 800 million project revealed that the Bank had failed to observe
proper requirements for relocation and resettlement, and that the project had
tenuous economic justification given the fragile state of Nepal’s economy.
After considering the IP’s report, (then) Bank President James Wolfensohn
completely terminated the Bank’s support for the project. Interestingly, in
their initial response to the Request, Bank management had essentially re-
jected the veracity of the Requesters’ claims and challenged the eligibility
of the Request, a pattern that would reoccur over the coming years (Naude´
Fourie, 2014).
Protracted Resistance (1995 to 1999)
After periods of negotiation and emergence, the next few years were tumul-
tuous for the IP. The period following the Nepal Arun III investigation in
1995 up to the filing of theChinaWestern Poverty Reduction Project Request
in 1999 saw the re-emergence of intense and protracted resistance against
the IP fromwithin theWBG—often pitting borrower states (objecting to the
12 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Andria Naude´ Fourie and May Tan-Mullins
Figure 3. Overview of World Bank Management Eligibility Challenges, per
Year (1994–2016)
Source: analysis by the authors.
Panel, since it was viewed as a means of investigating borrowers) against
donor states (supporting the Panel as a means of holding management to
account and improving development effectiveness). Bank management, on
the other hand, strengthened its pattern of denying the eligibility and sub-
stance of claims in initial Requests, while simultaneously submitting action
plans aimed at correcting shortcomings. As Figure 3 depicts, at least 60 per
cent of the Requests filed between 1995 and 1999 were challenged by Bank
management.
In practical terms, protracted resistance from multiple parts of the WBG
meant that only two significantly limited investigationswere launched during
this time (Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyreta´ Hydroelectric Project, and India:
NTPC I Power Generation Project). Reflecting on this period, Clark (2003a:
3–4) notes that:
Bankmanagement resented the panel’s scrutiny and strongly resisted being held accountable.
Management responses to the Inspection Panel claims tended to deny policy violations and
deny responsibility for problems identified in the claim (usually blaming the borrowing
government for the problems instead). Management responses also tended to challenge the
eligibility of claimants and propose ‘action plans’ as alternatives to panel investigations.
Although such thinking simplifies the storyline to a narrative of a heroic
IP battling against a monstrous WBG, a notion this article challenges, it
underscores how the Panel began losing credibility among external stake-
holder groups. This loss of credibility is reflected in Dunkerton’s (1995: 228)
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criticism that the panel was nothing more than a ‘public relations tool for
the Bank and a political liability for borrowing nations’.
This period was replete with attempts to reform and salvage the IP. A first
round of reforms spearheaded by internal actors and supported by external
civil society actors started in 1995. This was followed by a more extensive
round that concluded in 1999 and culminated in a set of ‘clarifications
on certain aspects of the Inspection Panel Resolution’ (incorporated in the
World Bank Operations Manual, BP 17.55, Annex A, B and C).2 Amongst
other things, clarifications affirmed the ‘importance’, ‘independence’ and
‘integrity’ of the IP and instructed project managers and staff to base their
recommendations on the findings of the Panel, instead of pre-empting Panel
investigations by submitting ‘Action Plans’ after a Request was filed.
Significantly, the clarifications reflected a compromise concerning the
board’s authorization of investigations, which theoretically was on the basis
of consensus. Management’s early submission of remedial action plans and
the Panel’s extensive eligibility reports invariably resulted in discussions
about the merits of the case, which were not based within a formal investiga-
tion. Under these circumstances, it became impossible to reach a consensus
within the board, especially as those board members representing borrow-
ers perceived the IP process as a smokescreen for investigating borrower
conduct. The 1999 clarifications broke this stalemate by requiring early dis-
cussions to focus strictly on the procedural elements of the process. ‘If the
panel so recommends’, ‘the board will authorize an investigation without
making a judgment on the merits of the claimants’ request, and without
discussion’, except with respect to ‘technical criteria for eligibility’.3
In practice, the Panel’s recommendation on the need for an investigation
would also be considered on the basis of the board’s ‘no-objection proce-
dure’ (a default whereby cases proceed unless the board objects, rather than
needing approval on a case-by-case basis), thus limiting the scope for ex-
tensive debate within the board (Bradlow and Naude´ Fourie, 2013; Shihata,
2000). The 1999 reforms set the stage for a new period.
Assertion of Independence and Authority (1999 to 2008)
If the reform initiatives of the previous period ‘set the stage’, the period
from 1999 to 2008 can be viewed as one where the Inspection Panel
‘took to the stage’ with a marked degree of assertiveness. The first case
marking the beginning of this period, China Western Poverty Reduction
Project, served as a litmus test for the strength of the board’s commitments.
2. Accessible at: https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/PPF3/Pages/Manuals/Operational%20
Manual.aspx
3. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/Clarifica-
tionSecondReview.pdf
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During this time, the IP not only asserted its institutional independence, but
also expanded its functional mandate beyond its original scope and remit
by asserting its ‘quasi-judicial authority’ (Naude´ Fourie, 2012). The IP’s
influence increased, moving beyond the role of ‘fact-finding on behalf of
the board’:4 examples included adopting procedural innovations (such as
the practice of deferring its recommendations on investigations, allowing
management more time to address problems raised in a Request); and em-
ploying expansive interpretation techniques, often with the effect of limiting
the discretion of management in applying the OPPs (Bradlow and Naude´
Fourie, 2013).
This period also marked a few prominent milestones in the history of
the Panel, including the first instance in which the IP challenged the long-
standing position of theWorld Bank on human rights (that is, that the Bank’s
mandate, as per its Articles of Agreement, only extends to social, economic
and cultural rights, not civil and political rights). The Panel explicitly ques-
tioned this argument in the 2001 Chad Petroleum Pipeline case, asserting
that it ‘felt obliged to examine whether the issues of proper governance or
human rights violations in Chad were sufficient to impede the implemen-
tation of the project in a manner compatible with the Bank’s policies’, and
that the IP was ‘convinced that the approach taken in our report, which finds
human rights implicitly embedded in various policies of the Bank, is within
the boundaries of the panel’s jurisdiction’.5
The potential for tension remained embedded in both the Panel’s man-
date and the way in which the Panel chose to execute it. The China Western
Poverty Reduction case provides a noteworthy example. The Panel’s prelim-
inary review and recommendation for a full investigation occurred in spite
of Chinese objections (Shihata, 2000). The board authorized this investiga-
tion, as well as the IP’s full investigation and subsequent report that detailed
various design shortcomings and non-compliance. This was hailed by many
(external) stakeholders as a resounding victory (Clark, 2003a, 2003b). The
response of Bankmanagement, however, was highly critical of the IP for dis-
regarding effectiveness and efficiency considerations (Bottelier, 2001; van
Putten, 2008). The board’s adoption of the IP’s China Western Poverty Re-
duction investigation report also marked the formal withdrawal of China’s
financing application to the Bank. China affirmed that it was: ‘[g]reatly
concerned about what has become clear in this process — and which con-
stitutes a great challenge facing this institution. Namely the fact that com-
pliance policies have been interpreted by some to an extreme and used for
political purposes. By such action the Bank’s mission — particularly its
4. See ‘Chad: Petroleum Development and Pipeline (2001)’, Inspection Panel Chair Ad-
dress to the Board, p. 4, accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Panel_
Cases.aspx
5. Ibid.
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development effectiveness — has been jeopardized’.6 The Panel’s relative
‘success’ during these years therefore coincided with mounting competitive
pressure on the Bank — pressure which increasingly involved prominent
borrowers such as China, India and Brazil.
Renewed Tension (2008 to 2013)
The IP’s performance seems to have peaked around 2007–09, based on
the number of Requests filed and registered, the number of cases in
which management challenged the Request’s eligibility for investigation,
and the actual investigations performed by the Panel. Around the same
time, tensions started to resurface surrounding the IP and its relationships
with the Bank’s executive board and management, as well as the Bank’s
external stakeholders. These tensions were reflected in an upsurge of
challenges from management about the eligibility of Requests for inves-
tigation (around 64 per cent, on average, between 2010 and 2013). Increas-
ingly, these eligibility challenges focused on what management saw as the
lack of causal links between (alleged) harm and World Bank actions or
omissions.
In theWest Bank/Gaza Red Sea case,World Bank management expressed
‘great concern [over] any suggestion that Bank support for studies, which in
no way commit the Bank to go forward with financial support for a potential
project, could be eligible for investigation’, particularly since ‘the mere gen-
eration and dissemination of knowledge in the form of the Study Program,
which is not a Bank project, cannot result in direct material harm’ (man-
agement response to request, para. v).7 The existence of a ‘plausible causal
link’ between Bank actions (and omissions), and actual or potential harm
also formed a major point of contention between Bank management and the
IP in the Ethiopia Protection of Basic Services Project. The IP’s investiga-
tion and management’s subsequent recommendations triggered significant
criticism within the NGO community. Inclusive Development International
published a scathing report in 2015 accusing the Bank of having ‘white-
washed damning evidence of widespread human rights abuses in connection
with its flagship program in Ethiopia’ and shelving evidence obtained during
the IP investigation ‘in order to exonerate the bank and one of its biggest
clients of responsibility for mass forcible population transfers that occurred
between 2010–2013’.8
6. World Bank Press Release, 7 July 2000, accessible at: http://go.worldbank.org/
TX5D7PGU80
7. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Panel_Cases.aspx
8. Accessible at: http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/world-bank-whitewashes-ethiopia-
human-rights-scandal/
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Figure 4. Requests Received versus Requests Investigated (1994–2016)
Source: analysis by the authors.
During this period, Bank management became ‘extremely defensive’ and
increasingly challenged the legitimacy of the IP’s findings (Bulgaski, 2016a,
2016b). The 2012 South Africa Eskom Investment case provides another no-
table example. In its response to the IP report, management rejected all IP
findings of non-compliance and identified no corrective actions — a devia-
tion from previous management responses (Naude´ Fourie, 2014). Moreover,
responding to the Panel’s comments on ‘systemic issues’, management noted
that since such comments fell outside the Panel’s mandate, it would offer
‘no comment’ in response.
The period between 2008 and 2013 saw a significant expansion of the
practice of deferring Panel decisions on whether a recommendation was
warranted. On the one hand, the Panel’s practice of deferral can be construed
as a reaction to external criticisms that the IP process did not provide effective
remedies for project-affected people (Ananthanarayanan, 2004; Carrasco
and Guernsey, 2008; Circi, 2006; Nurmukhametova, 2006; Orakhelashvili,
2005). By finding the Request ‘eligible’ for investigation (in terms of the
‘technical eligibility criteria’) but deferring its final decision on whether
to recommend a full investigation, Bank management was afforded the
opportunity to address the specific concerns of Requesters. However, such a
deferral eroded the Panel’s institutional authority and its external credibility.
After 2010, amarked decline in full IP investigations occurred (see Figure 4).
In 2012, the WBG launched a controversial review of its full suite of
safeguard policies, noting that it needed to ‘better align the policies with the
changing needs and aspirations of borrowers, the external context, and the
business of the Bank’ (World Bank, 2012: 1). Also within this period, the
IP announced that it would be reviewing its own Operational Procedures; a
process that culminated in the adoption of revised procedures in early 2014
which changed the way the IP operated.
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Contestation and Eroding Credibility (2013 to Present)
The new IP operating procedure (effective from April 2014) resulted in a
number of significant changes that are indicative of contention and may
erode the IP’s institutional independence and authority.
A first change concerns the adoption of an ‘early solutions’ pilot approach
in 2013. For cases included in the pilot, on agreement with Requesters and
management, the Panel would postpone registration (and thus, the determi-
nation of technical eligibility and the necessity for an investigation) in order
to allow management to interact with Requesters and attempt to address
specific concerns. As of late 2017, only two cases had been processed as
part of the pilot approach — both ending in non-registration of the case on
the basis that the Requesters’ claims had been addressed to their satisfaction,
and thus in the avoidance of an investigation. Several civil society organiza-
tions have expressed their concern with the procedural safeguards extended
to Requesters, especially in light of the stark power imbalances that exist
between Requesters and Bank management (Bugalski, 2016b).
Additionally, the avoidance of an investigation could mean that serious
policy non-compliance would remain unchecked and might indeed result
in missed opportunities for institutional learning. The first Pilot case —
Nigeria: Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project, filed in
2013 — would appear to substantiate such arguments. The case concerned,
amongst other things, the forced eviction of a slum community and in-
adequate compensation for involuntary resettlement, issues that the Bank’s
policy on Involuntary Resettlement specifically aims to prevent. The Panel’s
preliminary (and invariably cursory) investigation into the facts revealed sev-
eral indications of serious non-compliance with the policy on Involuntary
Resettlement, including the retroactive design and implementation of the
Resettlement Action Plan (policy stipulates that Resettlement Action Plans
must be developed during the initial stages of the project, involving active
participation of project-affected people). Despite the Panel commenting on
such ‘major shortcomings’, the process ended in non-registration, even as
the Bank was taking action to address Requesters’ claims with regards to
compensation (Bugalski, 2016a, 2016b).
A second change adopted during this period concerns the admissibility
criteria applied by the IP when considering the initial registration of a case.
Significantly, revised operating procedures include the requirement that ‘[a]t
least one component of the project/program which is the subject of the Re-
quest’ could ‘be plausibly linked to the alleged harm’ (Inspection Panel
Operating Procedures 2014, para. 25[c]).9 Up to this point, such consid-
erations would have formed part of the Panel’s eligibility determination,
following registration.
9. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/2014%20
Updated%20Operating%20Procedures.pdf
18 Benjamin K. Sovacool, Andria Naude´ Fourie and May Tan-Mullins
Figure 5. Overview of Inspection Panel Requests Received but Not Registered
(1994–2016)
Source: analysis by the authors.
Between 2013 and 2016, about 56 per cent of IP claims received were not
registered, compared with an average rate of 16 per cent non-registration
between 1999 and 2012, as Figure 5 depicts. The lack of a ‘plausible link’
between alleged harm andWorld Bank non-compliance continues to feature
prominently among the reasons provided for non-registration, even though
the Panel had, on several occasions in the past, asserted that the determina-
tion of a causal link between alleged harm and non-compliance was some-
thing that could only be reliably determined on the basis of an investigation
(Naude´ Fourie, 2016: 144–45). Furthermore, in the 2015 Haiti: Mining Di-
alogue Technical Assistance Request, the IP explicitly reversed its earlier
conclusion on the interpretation of a ‘project’ as determined by the 2011
West Bank/Gaza Red Sea — Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program
case.10 In the Haiti case, the IP concluded ‘that the issues of harm alleged
in the Request may not be the subject of a Panel’s investigation, which is
intended to present Panel’s findings on whether the Bank has complied with
all relevant policies and procedures and whether the harms alleged in the
Request have totally or partially resulted from Bank failure to follow such
policies and procedures’ (Eligibility Report, para. 26).11 While the Panel ac-
knowledged that, in the Dead Sea Water case, it had ‘ruled that under some
conditions [a project financed by means of a Bank-Executed Trust Fund]
can be covered under the Panel’s Resolution and thus become eligible for an
investigation’, it now ruled that ‘the subject of this particular Request [was]
not eligible’ (Eligibility Report, para. 26).12
10. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AllPanelCases.aspx
11. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AllPanelCases.aspx
12. Ibid.
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On the other hand, the 2017 Uganda Transportation Section Project Re-
quest serves as a vivid illustration of the continued need for a body such as
the IP, and of the continued influence of external pressure. As a result of this
case being filed at the IP, Bankmanagement became aware of serious allega-
tions of sexual misconduct by road workers associated with the project, and
undertook concrete action to remedy the situation, including suspending and
eventually cancelling the project (Investigation Report, v–vii) — even be-
fore the Panel investigated the claims.13 Nevertheless, the board authorized
a full IP investigation into the project, while Bank management, in response
to the Panel’s findings, arranged for the victims to receive support from the
Bank’s Emergency Child Protection Response Program (First Management
Progress Report, 30 March 2017).14
DISCUSSION: THE CONTESTED POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
A few patterns emerge when one considers the different phases of IP in
their entirety. Firstly, Bank management and the board have varied in their
reactions to the IP, ranging from discomfort to explicit dissatisfaction, to pe-
riods of greater institutional credibility with the board and, in particular, with
management (Naude´ Fourie, 2015). Secondly, at times, the IP has been able
to assert its authority strongly — even confidently — vis-a`-vis management
and board. At other times, however, the Panel has operated in a defensive
and/or reactive mode, taking explicit measures to defend its institutional
independence or reacting to criticisms voiced by internal stakeholders (such
as the need to take development effectiveness and efficiency matters into
consideration) and external stakeholders (such as the need to ensure that the
IP mechanism results in recourse and redress for project-affected people).
Indeed, when considering the IP’s behaviour over time, it would appear
that the Panel fluctuates between periods of ‘activism’ and ‘restraint’. Tem-
porally, the six phases of IP development demonstrate punctuated equilibria
— distinct and often non-linear shifts — in the exercise of organizational
power, marked by several ups and downs. To paraphrase from the analysis
presented above: the negotiation and onset of the emergence phases were
marked by a strong assertion of IP authority, which was followed by an ex-
tended struggle for independence and impartiality as the IP’s power waxed
and waned from inside and outside the WBG during the period of protracted
resistance. This changed during a prolonged period in which the IP asserted
its institutional independence and authority — which, again, was followed
by a period of renewed tension, resulting in a period of contestation. This
last period, which has seen an erosion of the Bank’s safeguard principles and
13. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AllPanelCases.aspx
14. Accessible at: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AllPanelCases.aspx
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a more myopic focus on protections for project-affected peoples, raises the
question of whether the IP’s own credibility — among internal and external
stakeholders alike — is also being significantly eroded.
In executing its development function, theWBG has to balance a wide and
diverse range of interests, many of which have the potential to directly clash.
This potential for conflict is already reflected in the Bank’s mandate, which,
as Bradlow (2011) observes, is dual in nature. As an intergovernmental
organization, the Bank’s development mandate is public, originating from
its member states (ibid.) and encompassing matters that are of ‘common
interest’ (Hey, 2004). But there is also a commercial aspect to the Bank’s
mandate. As a participant of financial markets, the Bank has to maintain its
excellent credit rating by doing what is expected of all commercial entities:
growing revenue while reducing costs (Bradlow, 2011). The public and
commercial aspects of the Bank’s mandate do not always fit comfortably;
the resulting potential for conflict is evident, for instance, in the criteria
specified within the World Bank’s performance scorecard (World Bank,
2014; Naude´ Fourie, 2016).
Moreover, the potential for conflict between public and commercial inter-
ests has only deepened with the emergence of new global rivals such as the
New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai (led by the so-called
BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), created with the
purpose of ‘mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable devel-
opment projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies’
(Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2014). The Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB) is another rival, launched in 2014 and being championed
by China, its largest shareholder. Together with the recently launched Silk
Road fund, the AIIB is seeking to make China the premier Asian infrastruc-
tural financier (Kamal and Gallager, 2016).
To be sure, the AIIB’s current committed capital is only US$ 200 bil-
lion, which is a relatively small sum compared to projects funded by the
Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. However, the existence of
the AIIB, together with other emerging infrastructural financiers, directly
challenges the WBG’s ability to secure new projects in the Asia Pacific re-
gion, currently the largest market for infrastructural projects. Significantly, a
major attraction of these new financiers is their commitment to provide loans
with as few conditionalities as possible; they especially tend to be free from
the type of conditionalities associated with transparency, good governance,
and social and environmental safeguards that have become a hallmark of
WBG-financed projects. As such, the WBGmay feel particularly threatened
by China’s rising role as development lender, with commentators expressing
a concern that Chinese practices challenge hard-won reforms in the areas of
sustainable development, aid and official finance (Brautigam, 2011: 753).
WBG management might well have concluded that without substantial
institutional reform — including significant adaptation of the OPPs and so-
cial and environmental safeguard policies — the WBG will be marginalized
Contested Politics at the World Bank Inspection Panel 21
and made irrelevant by these new players. Such a marginalization would, in-
evitably, reduce the geopolitical and economic influence yielded by the Bank
and its key sponsors (the United States, Europe and Japan). The adoption of a
new Environmental and Social Framework in August 2016 (preceded by an
extensive consultative process involving internal and external stakeholders)
signifies the World Bank’s response to these pressures.
While it is too early to form conclusions as to how this framework will
be applied consistently in practice — and interpreted by the IP — various
commentators and civil society actors have expressed concerns, including
worries that the strength of the IP’s remit will effectively be weakened. The
new safeguards framework comes with some strengths: it engenders greater
flexibility and negotiability concerning applicable standards, which could
lead to more culturally appropriate or acceptable projects. Project appraisal
requirements are significantly reduced to expedite approvals, which can
result in poverty-reduction efforts being implemented more quickly. The
new framework also places expanded emphasis on borrowers’ (and less on
the Bank’s) responsibility for assessing risk, implementing safeguards, and
monitoring progress.
However, these benefits are achieved only by diluting other elements of
power and authority. Institutional accountability has been shifted to other
parties, the responsibilities of the Bank becoming more flexible and dis-
cretionary. ‘[A]s the Bank strives to recast itself as an attractive lender to
governments and public–private partnerships’, Bugalski (2016a: 2) warns,
‘there are emerging signs that it will sacrifice its system of accountability to
project-affected people that it has built — albeit on wobbly foundations, and
imperfectly — over the past three decades’. Or, as a former Bank official
remarked in 2015, ‘I am saddened to see now that pioneering policy achieve-
ments of the bank are being dismantled and downgraded . . . . The poorest
and most powerless will pay the price’ (quoted in Chavkin and Anderson,
2015).
In other words, the new paradigm at the WBG could imply that social and
environmental protections will not be allowed to obstruct an economic and
development agenda. For its part, themandate of the IP also reflects this dual-
ity— and the potential for conflict underlying it. Different stakeholders may
have very different ideas and expectations of the role of the IP. Viewed from
the perspective of internal stakeholders, the IP is a fact-finding body, acting
on behalf of the board, with activities primarily aimed at strengthening exist-
ing management and governance structures, while improving development
effectiveness by providing opportunities for institutional learning (Shihata,
2000). Borrowing countries, meanwhile, might view the IP as an indirect
means to investigate their own (and not World Bank) activities. The ap-
plication and enforcement of the Bank’s operational policy framework are
often seen as a major factor in increasing transaction costs — both financial
costs and the costs of the bureaucracy involved in ‘doing business with the
Bank’. Donor countries, on the other hand, might bemore inclined to support
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mechanisms such as the IP to the extent that they contribute to improving
lending quality and/or development effectiveness, in particular when such
issues are promoted by civil society organizations in the affected countries
(van Putten, 2008). Viewed from the perspective of external stakehold-
ers, the IP exists primarily as a means to extend accountability towards
affected parties (‘horizontal’ or ‘bottom-up’ accountability). This implies,
firstly, providing project-affected people and their civil society representa-
tives with an avenue for recourse and redress (Clark, 2003a; van Putten,
2008); and, secondly, providing interested parties (the ‘broader public’)
with a window into the World Bank’s development-lending operations and
a greater ‘voice’ in Bank decisions (Bissell, 2001; Bissell and Nanwani,
2009).
This mosaic of interests is well represented in any typical IP case. Cru-
cially, it leaves the Panel needing to find equilibrium among these conflict-
ing interests, while simultaneously preserving its own long-term survival.
Defining, and ultimately determining, the Panel’s effectiveness under such
circumstances is a complex endeavour. From the perspective of external
stakeholders, the IP might be viewed as ineffective because of its limited
mandate and because it can never be viewed as fully independent. ‘Be-
cause the Panel is an arm of the Bank’, Carrasco and Guernsey (2008: 578)
opine, ‘it is by definition an institution with a de facto World Bank bias
and consequently acts with the interests of the institution in mind and not
necessarily with the interests of the affected communities’. Internal stake-
holders, on the other hand, might consider the IP to be ineffective because
its limited mandate and entrenched institutional dependence affect its abil-
ity to independently judge policy compliance at the project level. Here, the
Panel’s attempts to incorporate community concerns might be perceived as
facilitating undue political influences — something from which the Bank is
expressly prohibited (van Putten, 2008; Woods, 2001).
Within this complicated judicial system, backlash is both a consequence
of IP action and a mechanism for reform. As the IP attempts to assert
and expand its independence and authority, it triggers factors which limit
further assertion and expansion (growth-limiting ‘backlash’). This affects
the Panel’s degree of independence and authority, culminating in pressure
exerted by management, stemming from intensified competition from new
lenders, or revised operating procedures that have the effect of limiting
the Panel’s mandate. Nevertheless, a prolonged reduction in the degree
of IP independence and authority can also trigger factors (decline-limiting
‘backlash’) to halt the further weakening of IP independence and authority.
This can include pressure exerted by civil society actors, or a reduction in
cases filed at the IP due to a lack of credibility among prospective claimants.
In sum, the IP illustrates how the dynamics of judicial oversight depend
on a complex adaptive system between authority and independence, and
demonstrates that this system can engender both conflict and the attainment
of punctuated equilibria.
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CONCLUSION
The World Bank Inspection Panel reminds us that accountability mech-
anisms represent a hybrid of transnational governance influenced by Re-
questers and project-affected peoples, national governments, Bank man-
agers, and other development donors. In this way, the IP should not be
viewed as a single type of entity. For its advocates, it is simultaneously
a system of quasi-judicial oversight, a source of expounded normative
standards, a review process for compliance, an arbiter of international hu-
man rights, and a facilitator of public participation in decision making. For
its critics, the IP is a symbol of Western imperialism, a technique of legiti-
mation for World Bank practices, and an obstacle to greater competitiveness
and volumes of lending, all with an ineffective and limited mandate by
design.
This creates a circulatory system of power that sees the organizational
efficacy of the IP — its ability to retain legitimacy and control, and also to
exert influence — oscillate. In such a complex and multi-scalar system, the
IP asserts its power and independence but remains limited by countervailing
pressures from the WBG (the board and management) and influenced by ex-
ternal factors such as perceptions among civil society groups and continuous
efforts to improve accountability at other international financial institutions.
A change in any one of these disparate conditions can lead to a shift in the
organizational power and legitimacy of the IP. This narrative of complex dy-
namics and power struggles challenges the more conventional (mainstream)
view of a heroic IP fighting to expose and reform a hegemonic WBG. The
IP is not only about delivering careful, well-researched investigation reports
which reveal World Bank failures to comply with safeguards. A second
interpretation sees the IP as an entity seeking to ensure its own internal sur-
vival, an arbiter of its own brand of legitimacy and accountability. A third
interpretation — even more critical — views mechanisms such as the IP
as visible symbols meant to divert attention from the World Bank’s gov-
ernance failures and to both obscure and maintain an imperialist Western
agenda (Vestergaard and Wade, 2013).
In addition to this interpretive flexibility about the nature of the IP, be-
cause of the punctuated equilibria its organizational power ebbs and flows,
meaning there are limits to what it can accomplish. The IP must struggle
against both the inertia of WBG operating practices and, at times, actively
hostile, ambivalent or myopic managers. There is also a concern that im-
proved accountability could come at the expense of project efficiency or even
of the core financial relevance of the Bank itself: strengthened external ac-
countability could increase the costs, administration and time ofWorld Bank
projects. According to this view, the Bank itself could become less relevant
and competitive compared to other financial institutions if overly burden-
some conditions are attached to its funding. These factors could explain why,
even with the perseverance and commitment of dedicated stakeholders, the
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IP has only investigated about 36 per cent of all the Requests it received
between 1999 and 2016.
The example of the IP requires that we rethink what is meant by efficacy or
effectiveness in institutional accountability. Even assuming that ‘effective-
ness’ is closely related to the realization of specific objectives or outcomes
(Shany, 2010), different stakeholders have very different ideas about what
those outcomes should be, and which should enjoy primacy (Naude´ Fourie,
2016). Since the IP’s inception, there have been conflicting expectations as
to whether it should be working to strengthen the Bank’s internal governance
structure or to expand the Bank’s external accountability towards project-
affected people by securing an avenue for recourse, remedy and redress
(Shihata, 2000).
Ultimately, our analysis suggests that effectiveness itself is a subjective,
dynamic and contested concept, and the IP must meet conflicted priorities.
The IP was born out of contestation and into a contested period of the
WBG, and throughout its life it has seen multiple struggles over power,
authority and legitimacy. The IP must remain effective not only in terms
of ensuring its own existence, but also in promoting its agenda of holding
the World Bank to account as well as protecting communities and, now,
assisting the Bank in its mission of renewed competiveness and disbursing
loans. The IP must also be seen as legitimate by civil society and affected
parties; in this endeavour, it may seek to galvanize support from its base
by delivering ‘knockout blows’ to the Bank to keep its stakeholders en-
gaged (Wade, 2009). Processes of legitimacy and accountability reflect not
only competing priorities but also competing interpretations of effective-
ness among different stakeholders— communities, shareholders, managers,
the Executive Board, society as a whole. Development finance involves
competing interests as well as competing conceptions and expectations of
accountability.
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